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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
JARED LOOSER, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, THE STATE INSURANCE 
FUND, and SPORTS CARS INCOR-
PORATED, 
Defendants 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case 
No. 8972 
The plaintiff was permanently injured on May 
25, 1957, at LaJunta, Colorado, when the left rear 
wheel of the vehicle he was driving collapsed, 
causing it to leave the road and tum over, pinning 
him in his seat. The plaintiff was employed as a 
mechanic and test driver by the defendant, Sports 
Cars Incorporated. He applied for compensation. 
1 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
After a contested hearing, compensation was denied 
and the plaintiff brings this review. 
SPECIFICATIONS OF ERROR 
Plaintiff contends that the Industrial Commis-
sion erred: 
1. In concluding that the accident which caused 
Mr. Looser's injuries did not arise out of or in the 
course of his employment. 
2. In denying the plaintiff's Application for 
Rehearing. 
3. In failing to make written Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law. 
4. In ruling that any document, other than a 
brief, filed after the thirty-day statutory period has 
passed cannot be considered by the Commission in 
reaching its decision regarding a pending applica-
tion for rehearing. 
5. In filing its denial for a rehearing while the 
petitioner's motion for an Order to grant plaintiff 
time to respond to the Memorandum of the Defend-
ants V\ras pending before the commission. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff "Vvas regularly employed as a mechanic 
and occasional test driver by the defendant, Sports 
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Cars Incorporated, and had been employed by the 
Company in that capacity for over one year. (R12) 
Under the terms of the employment contract, plain-
tiff was paid a guaranteed wage of $80.00 per week, 
or 60 per cent of what was charged customers of the 
company for the work which he performed each 
week, whichever was greater. His average monthly 
income for the first five months of 1957 was $604.00. 
CR 12) 
About three weeks prior to the accident involved 
herein, Mr. Ernest Schettler, the President and 
General Manager of the defendant, Sports Cars 
Incorporated, suggested to the plaintiff that he 
should prel?are his own automobile, an MGA sports 
car, for racing competition. Mr. Schettler said that 
the Company would pay for all the parts used to 
prepare the Looser automobile for racing, but insisted 
that any trophies that were won in competition had 
to be given to the Company to be placed in the Com-
pany showcase for advertising purposes. CR 14) 
On a prior occasion, Mr. Schettler had told the 
plaintiff that by showing the people what defendant's 
cars would do in competition they received much 
better advertisement than if they put a story in the 
newspaper. CR 22) 
The plaintiff refused to race his car, asserting 
that he could not afford it, and that racing was too 
hard on it. CR 38) 
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During this conversation, M. Ralph Bowyer, 
the Vice-President and Service Manager of the De-
fendant Company, who was the immediate supervisor 
of the plaintiff, entered the room. After hearing 
part of the conversation, he said, "If Chad (the 
plaintiff) has to drive in the race, he can drive a 
company car." (R 15) No more was said about 
racing at that time. 
The following day, Mr. Vaughn Funk, the Sec-
retary and Sales Manager of the Corporation, ap-
proached the plaintiff and told him to prepare a 
company car for racing competition, suggesting that 
they should test the car at LaJunta, Colorado, at a 
race scheduled there on May 25, 1957. (R 15) The 
following day, during the Company lunch hour, the 
plaintiff asked Mr. Schettler if he should prepare the 
Company car for racing in accordance with the pre-
vious instructions given to him by Mr. Funk. Mr. 
Schettler authorized him to proceed, telling him at 
that time that the company "·ould pay for the parts 
which were necessary to complete the ·work. (R 17) 
The plaintiff, assisted by Mr. Funk and a fellow 
employee, Paul E. Krug, then prepared the car for 
racing. The labor \Yas done vdthout any special 
compensation from the Company. The Company 
furnished and paid for all of the parts used in con-
nection therewith. This involved considerable ex-
pense to the Company. (R 18, 19) 
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On Friday, May 24, 1957, at about 1:00 p.m., 
the plaintiff and Mr. Funk drove to LaJunta, Colo-
rado, to participate in the forthcoming race. (R 24) 
Mr. Funk paid the gasoline and oil expenses incurred 
on the trip, but each of the participants paid for his 
own meals and living expenses during the trip and 
while at the site of the races. Also, each participant 
paid his own entry fee prior to the race. 
A few days before leaving for the race, plaintiff 
was contacted by Mr. John Brophy. Upon learning 
that the defendant company was planning to test one 
of its MGA cars at the LaJunta Race, Mr. Brophy 
requested that Mr. Looser do the last minute racing 
tune-up and adjustment work on his car at the site 
of the race. In accordance with Mr. Brophy's in-
structions, the defendant charged him in advance 
for any anticipated labor to be performed on his car 
in LaJunta. (R31, 32) Just prior to the accident at 
the Colorado track, plaintiff performed the work as 
agreed. (R 23, 24) 
Immediately prior to the commencement of the 
racing competition both Mr. Funk and the plaintiff, 
individually, engaged in familiarization trials with 
the racing car to enable them to test the track and 
determine whether the car was functioning properly. 
Mr. Looser asked Mr. Funk if he could take the car 
out on the track first, and the latter consented. They 
then took turns trying out the car, each .going for 
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a few laps at a time. On one occasion, Mr. Funk dis-
approved of the manner in which the plaintiff was 
driving the vehicle. To show his disapproval and to 
correct the situation, he stepped onto the signal lane 
and motioned the plaintiff to slow down. Mr. Looser 
then stopped the car and asked Mr. Funk if he wanted 
to take the car out. Funk answered that he didn't 
want to take the car out, but that he just wanted 
Looser to slow down. (R 65, 66) Shortly thereafter, 
while plaintiff was rounding a turn, the left rear 
wheel of the vehicle collapsed, causing it to leave the 
track and tum over, pinning the plaintiff in his seat. 
As a result of this incident, plaintiff suffered a frac-
tured dislocation of the lower dorsal spine \Yith para-
plegia. The attending physician reported that the 
patient will be permanently and totally disabled for 
the rest of his life, due to complete paralysis of all 
body parts below the \-Yaist. (R 10) 
After a contested hearing, the Industrial Com-
mission of Utah rendered its \Yritten decision adverse 
to the plaintiff. (R 70, 71) HoV\·ever, no -written find-
ings of fact or conclusions of la\v \Yere ever made 
and filed in this matter by the commissioner. 
On August 13, 1958, the plaintiff petitioned the 
defendant Industrial Commission of Utah for a re-
hearing of his claim for Workman's Com,ensation 
benefits. The application for''' ~hearing was filed 
within the statutory period required for such applica .. 
tions. (R 72, 73) 
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On September 11, 1958, plaintiff submitted his 
Supplement to Application for Rehearing which was 
then pending before the Commission. The Supple-
ment was filed after the statutory period had elapsed 
for the filing of Applications for Rehearing, but prior 
to rendering of the decision of the Commission on 
plaintiff's pending Application for Rehearing. 
On September 16, 1958, the plaintiff made ap-
plication to the Industrial Commission for an Order 
for Examination of Records. (R79) The commission-
er answered the application by letter dated Septem-
ber 22, 1958, denying authority to order the produc-
tion of such records. It was suggested by the com-
missioner that plaintiff file a Subpeona duces tecum 
to accomplish his purpose. (R 80) 
On September 24, 1958, plaintiff answered the 
letter of the commissioner. In the text of his answer-
ing letter, plaintiff asked that such letter be con-
sidered as a request for the issuance of the Subpeona 
Duces Tecum referred to above. (R 82, 83) The 
following day, the commissioner sent blank sub-
peona forms to plaintiff's attorney. 
On September 25, 1958, plaintiff filed a Second 
Supplement to Pending Application for Rehearing 
with the commission. (R 87, 88) This second Supple-
ment was also filed after the statutory period for the 
filing of Applications for Rehearing had elapsed, but 
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before the Commission rendered its decision denying 
the pending Application for Rehearing. Both the 
Supplements to the Pending Application for Rehear-
ing alleged the discovery of new evidence which was 
not available to the plaintiff at the time of the 
hearing. 
On September 29, 1958, the defendants filed a 
Memorandum of Defendants. (R 89-93) 
On September 30th, 1958, the plaintiff prepared 
and mailed a Motion requesting permission to answer 
the Memorandum of Defendants. (R 96) The records 
of the commission show that the Motion was received 
on October 1, 1958. 
On the 3rd day of October, 1958, the plaintiff 
received an Order of the commission denying his 
Application for Rehearing. CR 94, 95) The postmark 
on the envelope was dated October 2, 1958. In the 
Order, the commission ruled that any document, 
other than a brief, filed after the 30-day statutory 
period had elapsed could not be considered by the 
commission in reaching its decision in regard to the 
pending Application for Rehearing. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT 
SHOULD BE LIBERALLY CONSTRUED IN FA-
VOR OF COMPENSATION. 
In compensation cases, the Utah Supreme Court 
has uniformly held that all doubtful cases should 
be resolved in favor of awarding compensation. See 
M. & K. Corporation v. Industrial Commission, 112 
Utah 488, 189 P. 2nd 132, Chandler vs. Industrial 
Commission, 55 Utah 213, 184 P. 1020, Salt Lake City 
v. Industrial Commission, 140 P. 2nd 644, 104 Utah 
436. 
In theM. & K. Corporation case, the Court said: 
"We have also repeatedly held that this 
statute should be liberally construed and if 
there is any doubt respecting the right to com-
pensation, it should be resolved in favor of 
recovery." (Citing many cases.) 
For a recent discussion of current trends toward 
liberalization in awarding Workmen's Compensation 
benefits, see 6 Utah L. Rev. 290 ( 1958). 
II. UNDER UTAH STATUTES COMPENSATION 
SHOULD BE AWARDED IF EITHER (A) THE 
ACCIDENT ARISES OUT OF THE 'EMPLOY-
MENT, OR (B) IN THE COURSE OF THE EM-
PLOYMENT. 
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held 
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that recovery of Workman's Compensation under 
Section 35-1-45, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, may 
be based on either one of two things: (a) That the 
accident arose out of the employment, or (b) That 
it occurred in the course of his employment. Prior 
to 1919 the Section used the word "and," but in 1919 
the Legislature substituted the word "or" and since 
that date this court has consistently held that only 
one or the other need be shown. This is pointed out 
in numerous cases, one of the more recent being 
M. & K. Corporation, supra, 112 Utah 488, in which 
the court says: 
"Since the 1919 amendment to that sec-
tion (42-1-43) when the word 'or' which we 
have italicized above was substituted for the 
word 'and' it is not necessary for the accident 
to arise both out of and occur in the course of 
his employment, it is sufficient if the accident 
only arises in the course of his employment. 
Workmen's Compensation statutes both in this 
country and throughout the British Empire 
usually require, as did ours before the amend-
ment, that the accident arise both out of and 
in the course of the employment, and this 
must be kept in mind in considering the de-
cisions of other jurisdictions. We have often 
pointed out this distinction and indicated in 
many cases that the recovery was allowed on 
that account and that it probably would not 
have been allowed without the amendment." 
There are numerous Utah cases to the same 
effect. See Tavey v. Industrial Commission, 106 Utah 
489, 150 P. 2nd 379; Park Utah Consolidated Mines 
10 
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Co. v. Industrial Commission, 103 Utah 64, 133 P. 
2nd 314; Cudahy Packing Co. v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 60 Utah 161, 207 P. 148, and other cases cited 
therein. 
III. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION SHOULD 
HAVE CONSIDERED THE ALLEGATIONS CON-
TAINED IN THE TWO SUPPLEMENTS TO 
PENDING APPLICATION FOR REHEARING 
BEFORE GRANTING OR DENYING PLAIN-
TIFF'S APPLICATION FOR REHEARING. 
The commissioner states in his Order denying 
plaintiff's Application for Rehearing that no docu-
ment, other than a brief, filed after the statutory 
period has passed could be considered by the com-
mission in arriving at its decision. The plaintiff has 
been unable to find any indication in either judicial 
precedent or statute that allegations contained in 
supplements to pending applications for rehearing 
should not be considered by the commission. It is 
obvious from the record that the commission had not 
yet arrived at its decision to deny the application 
when the supplements were filed. Therefore, there 
was no reason to refuse to consider the information 
found in the supplements. In doing so, the commis-
sioner's action was arbitrary and unreasonable. The 
information was in the file at the time the case was 
reconsidered and the decision was made. The fact 
that the supplements were filed after the thirty day 
period had run did not result in any inconvenience 
11 
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or delay to the commission. Therefore, the Order 
denying the application for rehearing was not based 
on the information which was available to the com-
mission when it rendered its decision, and the pro-
ceeding should be sent back to the· industrial body 
to be reheard and redetermined. 
If the commission had recognized the supple-
ments for rehearing, it would have been compelled 
to grant a rehearing to the plaintiff. The supple-
ments allege that new evidence was discovered that 
was not available to the plaintiff at the time of the 
initial hearing. If the allegations of the plaintiff can 
be proved at a rehearing of the matter, the commis-
sion would be compelled to reverse its decision and 
award the plaintiff compensation under the Work-
men's Compensation Act. In the case of Jensen v. 
Logan City, 89 Utah 347, 57 P. 2nd 708, the Utah 
Supreme Court stated the following in regards to 
the granting of a new trial on the grounds of newly 
discovered evidence: 
"While the granting or refusing of the mo-
tion lies in the sound discretion of the court, 
where there is grave suspicion that justice may 
have miscarried because of the lack of enlight-
enment on a vital point which new evidence 
will apparently supply, and the other elements 
attendant on obtaining a new trial on the 
ground of newly discovered evidence are pres-
ent, it would be an abuse of sound discretion 
not to grant the same." 
12 
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In plaintiff's first Supplement to Pending Appli-
cation for Rehearing, it is alleged that newly dis-
covered evidence favorable to plaintiff and not pre-
viously available to him at the time of the hearing 
had been determined and discovered. The applica-
tion contained allegations as to the purported testi-
mony, if swom and allowed to testify, of John P. 
Brophy, who was a contestant in the race at which 
the plaintiff sustained his injuries. (R 75) It indi-
cates that Mr. Brophy had a conversation with the 
Vice-President and Service Manager of the corpora-
tion six weeks before the accident. At that time, the 
company representative promised Mr. Brophy that if 
he would undertake the expense of having his car 
reworked in preparation for the LaJunta race at the 
company shop, he would have Mr. Looser available 
at LaJunta to tune up and repair the car and make 
all necessary pre-race adjustments. He also promised 
to supply all parts and tools which might be required 
for said tune-up, repairs and adjustments. (R 75) 
This evidence, if allowed, would have con-
clusively sustained the allegations of the plaintiff 
that he was in the course of his employment at the 
time of the accident, and would have shown that the 
accident arose out of his_ employment. Therefore, the 
court should annul the decision of the commission 
and order that the matter be reheard to enable the 
plaintiff to present the newly discovered evidence.· 
See Miner v. Industrial Commission, .20.2 P . .2d 
557, i 15 Utah 88. 
13 
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IV. THE COMMISSION ERRED IN FILING ITS 
ORDER DENYING THE APPLICATION FOR 
REHEARING WHILE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
REQUESTING PERMISSION TO ANSWER DE-
FENDANT'S MEMORANDUM WAS AWAIT-
ING ACTION BY THE COMMISSION. 
On October 1, 1958, the plaintiff filed a motion 
requesting permission to answer the Memorandum 
of defendants filed with the commission on Septem-
ber 29, 1958. Without acting upon plaintiff's motion 
in any way, the commission made its Order denying 
the plaintiff's Application for Rehearing. Common 
trial practices require that when a motion is filed in 
a case pending before the Court, it must be ruled 
upon before the case can proceed. In other words, 
the Motion suspends further proceedings until it is 
disposed of by the Court. By ignoring plaintiff's Mo-
tion, the commission committed prejudicial error. 
Its failure to act on the pending Motion rendered its 
decision premature. The case 'Yas not ready for a 
decision because an important procedural step had 
not been completed. Although the instant case is 
before an administrative body rather than a judicial 
one, the requirements of procedural fair play de-
mand that the plaintiff's Motion to answer defend-
ant's Memorandum of Authorities should be granted 
or denied. In this case, the commission arbitrarily 
ignored plaintiff's Motion. In doing so it violated 
the rudimentary requirements of procedural due 
process provided to the plaintiff by the provisions of 
14 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the Constitution of the United States. Therefore, the 
decision rendered by the commission should be an-
nulled, and the commission should be ordered to re-
hear the matter now before the Court. 
See Morgan vs. United States, 304 U.S. 1-82 
L. Ed. 1129. 
V. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH IS 
REQUIRED BYLAW TO MAKE WRITTEN FIND-
INGS OF FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. 
The Industrial Commission of Utah failed to file 
written findings of facts and conclusions of law 
with its secretary after the hearing of this matter. 
It merely rendered its decision, wherein the com-
missioner reviewed parts of the evidence and held 
against the plaintiff. Under the Utah Workman's 
Compensation Statutes, the Industrial Commission 
is expressly required to make Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law in writing and file the same with 
its secretary after each formal hearing. 
35-1-85 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, reads as 
follows: 
"DUTY OF COMMISSION TO MAKE FIND-
INGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW -- FILING -- CONCLUSIVENESS ON 
QUESTIONS OF FACT -- REVIEW -- COURT 
JUDGMENT. 
"After each formal hearing, it shall be the 
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duty of the commission to make findings. of 
fact and conclusions of law in writing and file 
the same with its secretary. The findings and 
conclusions of the commission on questions of 
fact shall be conclusive and final and shall not 
be subject to review; such questions of fact 
shall include ultimate facts and the findings 
and conclusions of the commission. The com-
mission and every party to the action or pro-
ceeding before the commission shall have the 
right to appear in the review proceeding. Up-
on the hearing the court shall enter judgment 
either affirming or setting aside the award." 
Prior to 1949 the a hove statute did not include 
the first sentence as quoted above. In that year the 
Legislature amended the statute and added the first 
sentence as it now appears. The lawmakers left the 
wording of the former statute intact, but added the 
first sentence of the statute at that time. Utah cases 
decided by the Supreme Court of Utah prior to the 
amendment held that written findings of fact and 
conclusions of law were not necessary. 
See: Jones vs. Industrial Commission, 90 Utah 
121, 61 P2d 10. Salt Lake City v. lndw;-
trial Comnzission, 103 Utah 581, 137 P2d 
364. 
By an1ending the statute the Legislature made 
it mandatory that findings of fact and conclusions 
of law be made in writing and filed vdth the secre-
tary of the commission in each case. Plaintiff has 
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been unable to find any Utah cases dealing with this 
statute since it was amended. However, in other 
states having statutes similar to those in Utah, the 
courts have universally held that if the trial court 
or commission fails to make findings of fact and con-
clusions of law in writing, the decision of the hearing 
body must be reversed. Among these are the States 
of California and Kentucky. 
The California Labor Code, Section 5313, reads 
as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND AWARD, ORDER, 
ETC.: WHEN TO BE MADE BY COMMIS-
SION: REPORT: SEPARATE STATEMENT 
OF FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS: 
"The commission, panel, every referee or 
commissioner shall, within thirty days after 
testimony is closed make and file findings 
upon all facts irivolved in controversy and an 
award, order or decision, stating the determi-
nation as to the rights of the parties, and in 
addition thereto and concurrently therewith 
shall make and file a written report. Such re-
port shall separately state the findings of fact 
and conclusions of laW. The findings, de-
cisions, order, or award and the accompanying 
report shall, if made by the commission and 
panel, be signed by a majority of the com-
mission." 
Recent California cases which hold, that the In-
dustrial Commission must comply with the above 
17 
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statute are Pierson v. Industrial Commission, 98, Cal. 
2d. 598, 220 p2d 794 and Dawson et al v. Industrial 
Commission et al., 54 Cal. App. 2d 594, 129 P2d 479, 
( 1942). 
In the Pierson case the Calnornia court set forth 
the requirements under the above statute as follows: 
''The commission should make specific 
findings on all material issues presented in a 
claim for compensation." (Quoting many 
cases) 
"The findings of the commission should 
conform to the general rules applicable to 
findings in trials which are conducted in the 
Superior Court." (Quoting many cases) 
The court held that in view of the failure of 
the commission to find or determine the issue of joint 
employment, the a\Yard would be annulled and cause 
remanded for further proceedings on that issue. 
Section 4933 of the Kentucky Statutes relating 
to the administration of the Kentucky Workman's 
Compensation La\v provides as follo,vs: 
"The board or any of its members shall 
hear the parties at issue and their representa-
tives and \Yitnesses shall determine the dispute 
in a sun1mary manner. The award, together 
with a statement of findings of fact, rulings of 
law and other matters pertinent to the question 
at issue, shall be filed with the record of pro-
18 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ceedings and a copy of the award shall im-
mediately be sent to the parties in dispute." 
Typical of all the Kentucky decisions pertaining 
to the above statute is the case of Yeager v. Mengel 
Company, 242 Kentucky 543. 46 S.W. 2d, 1076. In 
that case the Court stated the law as follows: 
"The identical question has been presented · 
to this court in a number of recent cases, and 
we find the prevailing rule to be that, where 
there is a dispute in the facts or as to the 
natural inferences to be drawn from the proof, 
and the award is not accompanied with a 
statement of the findings of fact, etc., as re-
quired by the statute, the case will be remand-
ed back through th~ Circuit Court to the com-
pensation board, with directions to make the 
award in strict conformity with the statute." 
(Citing many cases) 
In the instant case the Utah law is very specific. 
The amendment to the statute makes writte'n find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law mandatory. Since 
the Industrial Commission failed to follow the re-
quirements of the statute, it is impossible to tell what 
facts were found in reaching the decision and upon 
what conclusions of law the decision is based. Because 
of the failure to conform to the laws of the State of 
Utah, the commission's decision cannot stand and 
must be sent back for a rehearing. 
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VI. THE ACCIDENT INVOLVED HERE AROSE 
OUT OF PLAINTIFF'S EMPLOYMENT. 
The decision shows that the Industrial Commis-
sion concerned itself primarily, if not exclusively, 
with the question of whether or not the plaintiff was 
acting in the course of his employment when he was 
injured. The commissioner touched on certain facts 
which indicated that he placed the issue as one of 
whether or not the defendant could control the ac-
tivities of the plaintiff at the LaJunta race. Let us 
concede, for purposes of this argument, that he was 
not in the course of his employment when he was 
injured. Nevertheless, the Utah statutes under the 
cases cited in point II above, allow recovery if the 
accident which resulted in Mr. Looser's injury arose 
out of his employment. 
We submit that except for the fact that plaintiff 
was employed by the company, he would never have 
been injured. The record shows that the President 
of the defendant company urged the plaintiff to take 
part in racing activities 'vith his own automobile, 
but he '''anted the trophies 'von in such ac-
tivities to be placed in the company showcase for 
advertising purposes. (R14) Hovvever, plaintiff re-
fused to race his own car, c !aiming that racing was 
too hard on it. Then Vaughn Funk, an officer of the 
corporation, told the plaintiff to fix up a company 
car for racing purposes. The record further shows 
that other company cars had been raced at similar 
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races in previous years. (R 22) Mr. Schettler, the 
company President, had told the plaintiff that he 
considered such activities as good advertising for the 
corporation. (R 22) Mr. Schettler admitted on cross-
examination that the company experienced an in-
crease in business around race time. (R54) Because 
the plaintiff was paid on a commission basis for the 
work which he performed (R 12), he had a pecuniary 
interest in an increase of the company's business 
volume. To facilitate the participation of the com-
pany in future races, he even volunteered to do the 
labor on the racing vehicle without special charge. 
The company did not hesitate to furnish all of the 
parts free of charge for this venture. Are we to 
assume that the defendant would give over $250.00 
in parts (R 18, 19) and risk damage to a $5,000.00 
vehicle because it wanted to keep its employees 
happy? This would be a ridiculous assumption. How-
ever, the commission arrived at just such a con-
clusion. It is obvious that the company was happy to 
see the plaintiff go to the race. It not only encouraged 
him to do so, but also cheered his decision to go. It 
even allowed him time off to travel to the site of the 
race. (R 24) The fact that he was willing to prepare 
the car for them without special labor costs should 
not be used to deprive him of the benefits to which 
he is entitled under the Workman's Compensation 
Act. 
Cases cited hereinafter will demonstrate that it 
is not necessary that the racing of company vehicles 
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be specifically required of an employee before he 
can recover compensation under the provisions of the 
Act. All that is required is that the participation in 
races be reasonably related or incident to the employ-
ment. If it is, and an injury results therefrom, then 
the injury results from an accident which arises out 
of the employment. The cases are uniform to the 
effect that the words "arising out of" are construed 
to refer to the origin or cause of the injury, and in-
volve the idea that the accident is in some sense due 
to or caused by the employment, and the words "in 
the course or' refer to the time, place, and circum-
stances under which it occurred. See Utah Apex 
Mining Company v. Industrial Commission, supra. 
The case of Re:i,nert v. ~dustrial Acci-
dent Commission, 139 Cal. App. 2d 851, 294 
P. 2d. 713, is factually related to the case 
before the court. In that case, the plaintiff 
was employed as a recreational director at 
a camp set up for girl scouts. She \Yas allowed to 
take advantage of the recreational facilities avail-
able near her employment. She \Yas injured while 
riding horseback on her day off. The California 
court held that the injury arose from an accident 
arising out of and in the course of her employment 
even though she "·as riding for her own recreation 
and was in an area off the premises of the employer 
and not under its control. The court thought that 
the most significant consideration was whether or 
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not the activity was related to the employment or 
contemplated as part of the employment, and the 
fact that the injury occurred on premises not owned 
or controlled by the employer was not important. 
Other cases which follow the rule that the injury 
is compensable if received in an accident occurring 
while the employee is doing those reasonable things 
which his employment expressly or impliedly au-
thorizes him to do are: Employer's Group v. Indus-
trial Accident Commission, 37 Cal. App. 2nd 567, 
99P. 2d 1089, 1092, Phoenix Indemnity Co. v. Indus-
trial Accident Commission, 31 Cal. 2d 856, 193 P. 
2d 745. 
Another California case which is closely related 
to the above cases is that of Winter v. Industrial 
Accident Commission, 129 Cal. App. 2d 174. 276 P. 
2d 691. That case involved a claim for compensa-
tion by a golf caddy who lost an eye while playing 
golf. The injury occurred on the claimant's day off, 
while he was engaged in recreational activity per-
mitted by the employer. The club where the claim-
ant was employed allowed its caddies to use the 
facilities provided for its members and customers 
on Monday of each week, that day being their day 
off. Significant in this case is the fact that permis-
sion to use the facilities of the employer was based 
solely upon the fact that the claimant was employed 
as a caddy. In allowing compensation, the Court 
made the following statement: 
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"It was the employment which created 
the facts and conditions that brought the 
petitioner to the premises of his employer to 
engage in the permitted and encouraged re-
creational activity. The accident could have 
happened only at one place and the presence 
of the petitioner was due to his employment." 
The plaintiff is of the opinion that the Winter 
case and the instant case are very closely related. 
Mr. Looser would not have been engaged in 
racing if he hadn't been encouraged and per-
mitted by his employer to do so. Sports Car Incor-
porated even furnished the vehicle which was used 
in the race. 
We submit that in the instant case it was the 
plaintiff's employment which created the facts and 
circumstances that took the plaintiff to La Junta, 
Colorado, to engage in competitive racing. The 
accident could have happened at only one place, 
and the presence of the plaintiff vYas due to his 
employment. 
VII. THE PLAINTIFF 'VAS ACTING IN THE 
COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT ''THEN THE 
ACCIDENT OCCURRED. 
We believe that a reading of the decision of the 
Industrial Commission shovvs that the commission 
concerned itself primarily, if not exclusively, with 
the question of whether or not the defendant had 
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the right to control the plaintiff's activities at the 
time of the injury. It held that no such right of 
control was present. We wish to point out 
that the commission completely ignored the uncon-
tradicted testimony of Mr. Vaughn Funk, an officer 
of the corporation, showing that he exercised actual 
control over th.e plaintiff's activities at the time of 
the accident. Mr. Funk testified that he stepped out 
into the signal lane of the track during the pre-race 
trials and motioned to Mr. Looser to slow down. 
Plaintiff saw the signal, stopped the vehicle and 
asked Funk if he wished to drive. He answered that 
he did not want to drive, but that he merely wanted 
Looser to slow down. · The plaintiff complied with 
these instructions. CR 66) The commisssion made 
no mention of this incident in its decision, even 
though the incident shows the exercise of actual 
control by an officer of the defendant corporation 
over the manner in which plaintiff operated the 
vehicle on the track. In ignoring this uncontradicted 
testimony, the commission erred. Therefore, the 
Court should vacate the decision and instruct the 
Commission to award compensation to the plaintiff 
as prayed in this appeal. See Kent v. Industrial 
Commission, 89 U. 381, 57, P. 2d 724; and Spencer 
v. Industrial Commission 40 P. 2d 188. 87 U. 336. 
While at the cite of the La Junta races, and 
prior to the accident, the plaintiff did last minute 
tune-up and adjustment work on a vehicle belong-
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ing to one John Brophy, a regular customer of the 
defendant corporation. The work was done in ac-
cordance with an agreement made with the custom-
er several days before the race. Although this was 
not the primary purpose of the trip to La Junta, the 
record shows that company business was performed 
by the plaintiff at the cite of the races, and that the 
employer benefited therefrom by receiving money 
from Mr. Brophy for those services. The record 
shows that advance payment was made for such 
services, Mr. Brophy having paid the company 
before leaving Salt Lake City for La Junta. A duty 
then arose which obligated the company to perform 
services for the customer at the cite of the race. 
Mr. Looser could hardly have refused to render 
such services upon his arrival in La Junta. He had 
a duty to perform such services, on behalf of his 
employer, on the Brophy car in La Jlinta. Where 
such a duty exists, the injury arose out of or in the 
course of plaintiff's employment. See Stroud v. 
Industrial Commission, 272 P. 2d 187, 2 U. 2d 270. 
\V e are of the opinion that the Industrial Com-
mission failed to recognize the true significance of 
the service being rendered to the defendant corpor-
ation by the plaintiff. The commissioner's decision 
stated that the defendant may have received some 
incidental advertising benefit, but he disregarded it 
as a factor to be considered in rendering the deci-
sion. We submit that the commission erred in 
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failing to recognize the proper significance of this 
benefit to the company when it reached its decision. 
There are many cases which have allowed 
compensation to employees who were injured while 
participating in company sponsored recreational 
activities. The courts have generally allowed recov-
ery in cases where the employer has received sub-
stantial benefit in the form of good will through 
public interest in teams sponsored as part of com-
pany recreational activity. These cases usually 
involve situations where the company receives ad-
vertising benefit from the company sponsored team, 
but is not engaged in the business of sports promo-
tion as part of its usual course of business. 
Holst v. New York Stock Exchange, 252, App. 
Div. 233, 299 N.Y.S. 255, is a case that involved a 
youth employed by the stock exchange as a page. 
He was injured while playing soccer on a team 
maintained by his employer. The officials of the 
stock exchange assisted in organizing the soccer and 
other athletic teams, and the employees were urged 
to engage in these competitive sports. The employees 
were given time off for practice and for competitive 
games, and at times, consideration was given to the 
athletic prowess of the applicants when the new 
employees. were hired. The New York court held 
that the maintenance of the terms was a matter of 
business to the stock exchange, and that the claim-
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ant was engaged in his employment when he was 
injured. 
Another case which supports the abo:ve propo-
sition is that of LeBar v. Ewald Bros. Dairy, 217 
Minn. 16, 13 N. W. 2d 729. The facts of that case 
showed that Ewald Bros. Dairy was engaged in the 
dairy business. However, the company sponsored a 
softball team for its employees. It furnished balls, 
bats and other equipment, including shirts with 
the name of "Ewald" printed on the back. It never 
required its employees to play on a team or attend 
the games. Such participation by the employees was 
entirely voluntary. The games were played after 
the regular hours of employment. LeBar was injured 
while playing in a softball game. In awarding 
compensation, the Court said: 
"Concededly, respondent when playing 
on the team when injured was not engaged 
in any actual work of the dairy business. It 
occurred after his regular hours of work. His 
employers had not ordered him to be there. 
He knew he lost no wage, nor did he endanger 
his position as an employee by not partici-
pating in the game." 
The court held that the injury arose out of and 
in the course of employment. It held that the injury 
was incident to and a part <;>f the company's business. 
See also Piusinski v. Transit Valley Country Club, 
259 App. Div. 765, 18 N.Y. S. 2d, 316; Dower v. 
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Saratoga Springs, Comm., 267 App. Div. 928, 46 
N.Y. S. 2d 822; Linderman v. Cownie Furs, 234 
Iowa 708, 13 N. W. 2d 677; University of Denver v. 
Nemeth, 257 P. 2d 423. 
In the Utah case of Auerbach v. Industrial 
Commission, 195 P. 2d 245, 113 U. 347, the Utah 
court holds contrary to the above. However, it is 
the contention of the plaintiff that the instant case 
should be distinguished from the Auerbach case. In 
the Auerbach decision, the Utah court refused to 
allow compensation to a company employee who 
was injured while on a trip to play basketball for 
a team sponsored by the Auerbach Company. In 
that case, the company was engaged in the business 
of selling dry goods, and the sponsoring of athletic 
teams was not its primary activity. Any benefit 
which resulted therefrom was of no consequence. 
The Utah court indicated that the Auerbach 
Company was in the business of selling dry goods, 
not in the promotion of sporting events. 
In the instant case, however, the activity was 
directly related to the business of the company. 
Sports Cars Incorporated was in the business of 
selling MGA sports cars. Racing was its best type 
of advertising. It is difficult to conceive that the 
company would supply an expensive car merely for 
the purpose of providing recreation and thrills for 
its employees. 
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It is conceded that the plaintiff was not hired 
as a race driver, but the facts show that the com-
pany had no such drivers. The employees and 
officers did that kind of work in addition to their 
other duties. The fact that none of them were hired 
especially for this limited purpose does not take them 
out of the course of their employment, while en-
gaging in those activities. 
CONCLUSION 
In the light of the foregoing facts and authori-
ties, it is respectfully submitted that the decision 
of the Industrial Commission be vacated, and that 
the commission be ordered to award compensation 
to the plaintiff in accordance with the laws of the 
State of Utah, or that the commission be ordered 
to grant a rehearing of the evidence in the above 
case. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
BARTON, KLEMM & GOWANS 
410 Continental Bank Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
OWEN AND VVARD 
AND ROY G. HASLAM 
1 + 1 East Second South Street, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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